The Federalist

A collection of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison arguing in favor of ratifying the proposed Constitution of the United States of America.

• Federalist No. 1General Introduction
• Federalist No. 2Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
• Federalist No. 3The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
• Federalist No. 4The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence
• Federalist No. 5The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
• Federalist No. 6Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
• Federalist No. 7The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
• Federalist No. 8The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
• Federalist No. 9The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• Federalist No. 10The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
• Federalist No. 11The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
• Federalist No. 12The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
• Federalist No. 13Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
• Federalist No. 14Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
• Federalist No. 15The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 16The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 17The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 18The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 19The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 20The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
• Federalist No. 21Other Defects of the Present Confederation
• Federalist No. 22The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the Present Confederation
• Federalist No. 23The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
• Federalist No. 24The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
• Federalist No. 25The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
• Federalist No. 26The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
• Federalist No. 27The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
• Federalist No. 28The Same Subject Continued: The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
• Federalist No. 29Concerning the Militia
• Federalist No. 30Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 31The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 32The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 33The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 34The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 35The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 36The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation
• Federalist No. 37Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
• Federalist No. 38The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
• Federalist No. 39The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
• Federalist No. 40The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
• Federalist No. 41General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution
• Federalist No. 42The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
• Federalist No. 43The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
• Federalist No. 44Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
• Federalist No. 45The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
• Federalist No. 46The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
• Federalist No. 47The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
• Federalist No. 48These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
• Federalist No. 49Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
• Federalist No. 50Periodic Appeals to the People Considered
• Federalist No. 51The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
• Federalist No. 52The House of Representatives
• Federalist No. 53The Same Subject Continued: The House of Representatives
• Federalist No. 54The Apportionment of Members Among the States
• Federalist No. 55The Total Number of the House of Representatives
• Federalist No. 56The Same Subject Continued: The Total Number of the House of Representatives
• Federalist No. 57The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
• Federalist No. 58Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
• Federalist No. 59Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
• Federalist No. 60The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
• Federalist No. 61The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
• Federalist No. 62The Senate
• Federalist No. 63The Senate Continued
• Federalist No. 64The Powers of the Senate
• Federalist No. 65The Powers of the Senate Continued
• Federalist No. 66Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
• Federalist No. 67The Executive Department
• Federalist No. 68The Mode of Electing the President
• Federalist No. 69The Real Character of the Executive
• Federalist No. 70The Executive Department Further Considered
• Federalist No. 71The Duration in Office of the Executive
• Federalist No. 72The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
• Federalist No. 73The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
• Federalist No. 74The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive
• Federalist No. 75The Treaty Making Power of the Executive
• Federalist No. 76The Appointing Power of the Executive
• Federalist No. 77The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
• Federalist No. 78The Judiciary Department
• Federalist No. 79The Judiciary Department Continued
• Federalist No. 80The Powers of the Judiciary
• Federalist No. 81The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
• Federalist No. 82The Judiciary Continued
• Federalist No. 83The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
• Federalist No. 84Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
• Federalist No. 85Concluding Remarks